Open Source Application Security & Continuous Integration

Smoother App Security & Continuous Integration

Date: Thursday 7th July (8:30-11:00 AM)
Location: The Gherkin, Chivas Room 30 St Mary Axe, London, EC3A 8EP

360is consultants have been working-with and contributing-to Open Source Software projects for over 20 years. We helped build the worlds largest ISP using Open Source in the 1990s and today provide financial support to some of our favourite security projects.

We are holding a joint seminar with Black Duck and Forest Technologies for anyone who develops software and uses Open Source somewhere in their stack.

Attendees will learn how they can eliminate most common security vulnerabilities in their application or services at build-time, prior to deployment, long before their customers are put at risk.
Developers will learn how to screen source code against known security problems in an automated and accurate manner. Release managers will learn how to incorporate security testing into a continuous integration environment. 360is consultants will be on-hand to answer any questions you may have about Open Source Security, Testing, Secure Development, and Vulnerability Assessment & Remediation.

Attendance is free, but registration is required.

Agenda Overview:
8:30 - Buffet Breakfast

9:00 - Welcome.
Kevin Bland - Director Channel, EMEA, Black Duck Software

9:10 - The Application Security Continuum: From design to deployment, security must be considered at every stage of the software lifecycle if we are to minimize the risks of embarrassing and expensive failures.
Nick Hutton, 360is

9:40 - Continuous Delivery is the brain behind DevOps.
Jason Man, Forest Technologies

10:15 - Automating Open Source Security in Apps & Containers
Black Duck Software

10:45 - Conclusion & Wrap Up
Kevin Bland - Director Channel, EMEA, Black Duck Software

Mossack Fonseca Clients Awake To Find Themselves Adrift Offshore In A Leaky Boat

Today the executives of Panamanian-headquartered international legal and trust services firm Mossack Fonseca awoke to news that 11 million confidential documents spanning 40 years of the firms operation had been leaked to 107 media organisations in 78 countries. The documents purport to show how Mossack Fonseca has helped clients launder money, dodge sanctions and evade tax. Neither the identity of the leaker, nor the source material of documents itself have been publicly revealed. Instead, the source and his or her precise motivations remain secret, and we can expect a drip-feed of stories and revelations over the coming weeks and months as media organisations seek to maximise their commercial return from the 9-months of work we understand this investigation to have taken.

Putting to one side the moral and ethical arguments for and against the use of offshore tax havens, what do the Panama Papers tell us about the state of Information Security at Mossack Fonseca?

Back in 2010, we wrote about the US State Department leak of over a quarter of a million sensitive and secret cables spanning 35 years. We detailed ways in which an organisation, any organisation, can reduce the likelihood of sensitive confidential files (including personal and private information of its clients) escaping into the public domain. We described a framework that any organisation can use to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic leak of company secret information. That article is here.

Let’s examine this latest leak, and consider whether or not Mossack Fonseca could have learned something from the events of 2010. We will take each consideration in our framework in-turn.

Recognise Where You Are Vulnerable
Given how little we know about who provided the confidential information and their motivations, it's hard to make many assumptions about whether or not the firm knew it was vulnerable to this particular person or the methods they may have used to steal information. The leak may have come from an insider, a longstanding employee, perhaps even a senior executive, he or she may have been acting alone or with help, and may even have been coerced into exfiltrating the documents by an as-yet unknown 3rd party. However given what little we do know it seems unlikely that the board of directors at Mossack Fonseca truly understood quite how vulnerable they were to such a leak. If they did then they would have done something about it.  According to public sources, the company has between 200 and 500 staff around the world, and 20 former members of staff. It is a relatively small firm where Information Security should have been a tractable problem. When considering your vulnerability to a leak, think about the following:

• Where is confidential information kept in your organisation?
• In how many different places can it currently be found?
• Are multiple copies routinely created of confidential information?
• How many different access methods are there to this information?
• What size community of users have access to it?
• What controls are there over who can access what, where, and when?

Know If You Are A Target
The company must have known it was a target, their entire industry relies on confidentiality and secrecy. With current and former politicians, powerful businessmen and celebrities as clients, that much should have been obvious. Political enemies, nation states, criminals, and blackmailers would all have liked to get their hands on their information. Mossack Fonseca should have been devoting significant effort to its Information Security programs.

"Some organisations attract leaks because they are repositories for particular confidential information, or because the information they hold is highly newsworthy, others find themselves subject to leaks because their employees sometimes struggle with difficult and conflicting concerns about the nature of their work. While your newsworthiness may fluctuate over time, certain sectors tend to experience a perennial popularity with leakers. If you are in the energy, pharmaceutical, government, or banking sectors, you should consider yourself a prime candidate for leakers at this time. Companies engaged in arms manufacture or doing any kind of business in troubled parts of the world are likewise a target. Are you an aggregator of sensitive information from several of the sources above? If you operate a law or consultancy firm, or other business where you are entrusted with sensitive information from clients in these industries or geographies, then you will be a target for leaks."

Diligence & Statutory Obligations (Compliance)
While offshore locations are often preferred because they are relatively light on controls and heavy on individual privacy protection, increasingly they are having compliance obligations forced upon them. Whether or not this leak lands Mossack Fonseca in violation of compliance will be academic if their clients desert them as a result of it.

Segment Your Data
Given that the information leaked covers such a long period of time (many decades) and appears to include files on a diverse range of clients from statesmen to self-help gurus, it appears that nobody at Mossack Fonseca was segmenting their data. It is as-if there was one huge shared drive, one Email system, and the whole lot was dumped out. Segmenting data helps to contain information security failures, losing one class of systems or documents does not expose the whole.

• Segment by status: active client versus inactive/former clients.
• Segment by “security level” of the information: secret, confidential, unclassified.
• Segment by time: don’t keep files for completed projects with open client files.
• Segment by user/group: litigation versus patent, analysts versus sales.

Although it can reduce staff productivity and increase cognitive load, encryption can be used to reinforce the segmentation process. Did Mossack Fonseca individually encrypt the most sensitive documents or indeed any document in their organisation? It seems unlikely. Encryption of individual documents, or individual client folders is another way of limiting widespread uncontrolled disclosure of confidential information. It is not difficult to imagine a regime of individual passwords for individual projects, clients, or business units.

The Human Element, Maturity & Common Sense

We may never learn who is behind the leak, or hear first hand exactly what motivated them. We may never know if they are a current or former employee, a state-level actor, or just a particularly thorough and successful activist. We don't know anything about the firm’s culture or leadership at this point. All these things make it hard to comment on whether or not there is anything the firm could have done to avert this situation. In most instances where a company has lost control of its confidential information, there are things that could have been done with respect to the human element, to significantly reduce the chance of such a disastrous disclosure.  Staff vetting, the establishment of an ethics committee, monitoring, and a strong internal audit function can all help reduce the likelihood of such a large and damaging loss of confidential information.

Handling A Leak
The story is only just beginning for Mossack Fonseca and their clients, thus far we haven't seen a response from them either publicly or have any idea what they are doing internally.  What is clear already though is that this story is far from over and that there will be a continuous drip-drip of disclosures over the next few weeks and months. It is interesting that rather than making the entire document archive available online, the media organisations involved are choosing to be very selective about who and what they choose to write about.

What Next?

As Information Security professionals we have probably learned as much as we can from this disclosure. We expect the majority of the disclosures to be politically-motivated in nature, with a focus on Russia, Syria, Zimbabwe, North Korea, and any of those “twitter revolution” countries that haven't quite come around to the wests way of thinking. We expect disclosures about leaders of EU member states with politicians whose views differ significantly to those of Germany and the US, such as the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), and a sprinkling of celebrities, nobility, and more minor politicians or from countries that don't really matter very much. We expect the disclosures to almost entirely avoid large western corporations and the interests of those who own and operate them, which is interesting given that group probably makes up the majority of Mossack Fonseca’s clients.

360is are able to assist in improving your organisation’s Information Security posture, and in implementing the advice given in this article. While it may be impossible to guarantee that your confidential information will stay that way, you can significantly reduce the chances of the kind of widespread leak experienced by the Mossack Fonseca today, or the US State Department in December 2010. To speak to one of our consultants, visit our contact page and request a meeting.                                                                       

What does every UK Cyber Security startup need, that is worth more than gold?

It's not that I'm ungrateful George...

While compiling the next issue of Executive Intelligence, the Cyber Security briefing for UK decision makers, we came across an announcement from Chancellor George Osborne for a £250,000 programme to increase the rate of cyber security startup development in the UK. We aren't sure whether this announcement, made around the 27th January 2016 was something new or just an echo of a previous release from the 17th November last year, but we took the opportunity to study what was being announced more carefully this time.

The 'Cyber Safe' scheme, will offer advice and support to security startups, and will be open to applicants from March. The scheme is designed to increase the rate of new security startup development in the UK, identify new business ideas from the UK's leading security firms and provide support for security entrepreneurs.

While any assistance for startup and early stage technology companies in the UK is welcome, I'd argue that there are more directly beneficial things that could be done to stimulate and grow UK Cyber Security firms, things that would sustain such growth over 5 years, over 10, and beyond.

Startups, starting up, California style

It costs less than ever to move a software businesses from concept to prototype and on to minimum viable product. The UK is already arguably the best place in Europe to start a technology business. With professional social media, it is easy to connect with expertise and experience, to seek advice and assistance from those of us who have done it before in the UK market and abroad. While neither our climate nor the air quality around Silicon Roundabout is conducive to the kind of cafe-culture you'll find on Sand Hill road (come to think of it neither are the pavements) networking here is just as easy.

"Old Street is that way son"

Something less easy to achieve, and far more valuable to the Cyber Security entrepreneur, is the first customer. This is an area where UK Government has far to go.

According to a study last year by TechUK, only 20% of central government IT managers had "an appetite within their department to procure a higher percentage of technology services from SMEs". One can only imagine what percentage of them might be warm to startups. 5%? 2%? Zero?

The model that works in the US, is one where early stage companies can count on government in all its forms (military, intelligence, research, local, national, laboratories, and the rest) to be a customer of their service or product. That is the great thing about starting a Cyber Security firm in the US, long before specialist funding programs or affiliated venture firms appeared, someone, somewhere in US government was pretty much guaranteed to need your Cyber Security product, and to do business with a relatively small, relatively new, yes... relatively parochial firm who had cracked a tough problem. Contrast this with the TechUK study, or your own anecdotal experience.

"Present them with three options, two of which are,
on close inspection, exactly the same,
plus a third which is totally unacceptable.

I once attended a conference where a government procurement officer explained to the audience of his peers how they could carefully construct RFPs, RFIs, and tender documents for the specific purpose of excluding small firms, while staying within "SME friendly" guidelines issued by government. Never let it be said that the civil service is without ingenuity!

A pity, because government can be a great 1st customer and the benefits are not all one-way. The startup gets valuable feedback, real-life testing, requirements prioritisation, introduction to other potential early adopters, and (if all goes well) a reference customer, ignoring for one moment the financial benefit to the startup. The customer gets early access, the ability to shape the product to their needs, all the deployment assistance they could wish for, and more than likely the ability to cut the deal of a lifetime in terms of commercial arrangements.

But don't take my word for it, ask Black Duck, Aventail, Verid, Sanctum, E-Security, or any of the other successful Cyber Security companies that passed my desk at Fidelity Ventures looking for venture capital funding after the US government became an early customer.

Let's hope TechUK repeat their 2015 study this year and extend the survey to include attitudes to startups.

Social Engineering, Countering The Threat

Would You Buy A Used Monument From This Man?

"Count" Victor Lustig, con-man and Social Engineer, famously sold the Eiffel Tower. Twice.

Like accomplished Social Engineers of today, he was meticulous in his planning, thorough in his research, had an excellent understanding of human nature. He managed all of this without Google, FaceBook, Twitter, or his own printer back in 1925. Modern Social Engineers have it easy. What scams would Victor (real name Robert Miller) have to his name if he was around today? Which world leader, CEO, or politicians would be his victims?

360is have written a short guide to defending against modern social engineering attacks, and are now introducing our social engineering services to clients and partners by means of a presentation. If you are concerned that a modern day Lustig may find your organisation and its information assets easy prey, then we can help. Get in touch.

Social Engineering + Converged Communications = Bad For Security

John, I'm afraid I've got some very bad news for you.

We've recently learned that even the Director of the CIA can't keep hackers out of his e-mail. A teenager hacked into CIA Director John Brennan's AOL account. He says he did so by posing as a Verizon employee to other Verizon staff to get personal information about Brennan's account, as well as his bank card number and his AOL e-mail address. Then he called AOL and pretended to be Brennan. Armed with the information Verizon had just given him, he convinced AOL customer service to reset his password.

Brennan didn't have a bad password, he didn't e-mail it to anyone, he wasn't even tricked into entering it into a fake web page, the security failure here belonged to AOL and Verizon, and it wasn't even a technical failure at that. Now Brennan's e-mail is part of Wikileaks and a thousand articles.

Security experts including 360is have long since recommended 2 factor authentication systems for all of our clients, and yet still relatively few organisations have this kind of authentication. Their reasons? Cost, complexity, and (in)convenience. Over the last 20 years there have been a number of different companies attempting to tackle the three Cs, some of the more recent attempts make use of mobile devices and "soft tokens" on those devices, or they use instant messaging as a secure channel to convey some passcode or challenge/response.

Is there such a thing as too much convergence?

What if we are using multi-factor authentication, but thanks to the wonder of converged communications...all my factors converge upon 1 single device, normally a smartphone or tablet? What if that device were itself, compromised? Mobile devices can be cloned, rooted, or otherwise compromised just like any computer. How would that possibility change the level of trust you place in these kinds of multi-factor authentication? What if I am also trying to login to the secure service in question from that very same mobile device? If an attacker has my phone under his control, or has bamboozled me into doing something with it which help him, what happens to "defence in depth" and "fail safe"?

For these reasons, and because we don't think using 2 factor authentication should mean you have to trust a 3rd party organisation, we recommend keeping your factors as separate as possible for as long as possible. Talk to us if you want to harden your organisation against hackers, social engineers, and end users who sometimes make poor security choices.

Countering The Social Engineering Threat

An increased number of clients are experiencing social engineering attacks either directly against their finances and information assets, or the IT infrastructure upon which those assets depend for confidentiality and security.

Once only immediately saleable commodities such as credit card numbers were targeted. Now criminals are seeking medical records, credit history files, general personal identity information, significant cash funds, and online social media account information for purposes as diverse as blackmail, defamation, and identity or insurance fraud.

Highly targeted attacks often focus on uncovering commercial negotiating positions, cost-to-manufacture for orders, and in identifying holders of intellectual property or purchasing authority within an organisation. Those defending against such attacks now need to consider far more than simple monetary loss.

360is have prepared a short briefing for those tasked with defending their organisation and users from social engineering attacks including Phishing, Pharming, Vishing and SMishing. It is intended as an introduction to the technical, procedural, and human elements of a successful social engineering defence.

If you would like assistance in implementing any of the measures described in the document, or in understanding your own organisations vulnerability to social engineering attack, get in touch.

Download "Countering The Social Engineering Threat" here.

City Security Magazine, How To Avoid Leaks

Leaks are news, whether they are about Governments, Corporations, or individuals. City Security Magazine, the print and digital magazine that promotes security issues across the UK, carries an article from 360is on how to reduce your chances of becoming the next SONY, NSA, US State Department, or celebrity to suffer a breach of Information Security and have private and confidential information leaked to the public domain.

360is are able to assist in improving your organisation’s Information Security posture, and in implementing the advice given in the article. While it may be impossible to guarantee that your confidential information will stay that way, you can significantly reduce the chances of the kind of widespread leak experienced by the US State Department, the NSA, or SONY.
To speak to one of our consultants, visit our contact page and request a meeting.

Meet 360is At InfoSecurity Europe 2015

Three Sixty Information Security Ltd will be at InfoSecurity Europe, Olympia, London, 2nd to 4th June 2015. We'll be meeting clients, partners, and friends among the 12000 expected visitors and 330 stands at the show this year.

If you want to discuss the results of a penetration test, arrange a confidential meeting about a  breach, or just need advice on how your organisation should handle the latest bug disclosures, get in touch. We will have technical consultants at the show.

How do we validate a supplier has ISO 27001?

(c) Scott Adams

Most of the questions we get from our clients about ISO 27001, the standard for Information Security Management Systems, are about how they can implement this standard and possibly achieve certification.  We covered some of that in our previous blog.

The "other" question we get asked less often is "how do we validate a supplier or partner that claims to follow ISO27001 or claims to have been certified now or in the past?"
You may be surprised by the answer.


There is no such thing as a complete, current list of ISO 27001 certified companies.

That's right, it is impossible to obtain a definitive list of companies with ISO certification.

The creation of such a central list has been attempted in the past more than once, and for several ISO standards (notably ISO 9000) but such lists have always been incomplete and prone to going out of date. Part of the reason for this is that there is a competitive market between certification companies, they don't want to share their list of clients, or even indicate how many clients in total they might have, or how many might have once held certification which has since expired. Companies go out of business, get acquired, divested of, and restructured, and all these things mean that an ISO certificate issued in the past, may not count for much in the present unless the certified company has kept up with its maintenance audits (surveillance audits as we call them in ISO-speak).

Your best hope is to speak to the certification body the certificate holder used. For example, BSI allows you to query a certificate number against their database of clients to see if it was issued or is current here. Not all certification bodies have such an online service, and if you don't know who issued the certificate then you are out of luck.

360is is able to perform due diligence against your suppliers and partners to determine the strength of their information security, whether or not they have undergone any formal certification. If their technology, processes, or procedures do not provide adequate protection for your sensitive data, we are able to describe and implement improvements. If you are faced with meeting strict information security compliance targets yourself, we can help your formulate an appropriate response and program of improvements to meet expectations. Talk to one of our consultants.

ISO 27001, how do we prepare and what does it cost?

Need help preparing for ISO 27001? (c)Scott Adams

ISO/IEC 27001 is a standard providing requirements for an Information Security Management System (ISMS). It is part of the ISO 27000 family of standards, all of which help organisations keep information assets secure.

Like other ISO standards, some organisations choose purely to implement the standard in order to benefit from what it contains, while others decide they also want to get certified to reassure customers or clients that its recommendations have been followed. There are many Information Security standards out there (within specific industries, or for specific countries), ISO 27001 is one of the more widely recognised. 360is have been working to help companies implement the technical controls within ISO 27001 and its predecessors since the mid 90's. While we don't certify you against ISO 27001, we can help you prepare for your certification and pass your annual audits by having a strong Information Security posture.

What is an ISMS?

The Information Security Management System is a system in the broadest sense of the word. It is a mixture of people, processes, and IT systems (hardware, software, products and services) which allow you to manage risks relating to sensitive company information so that it remains secure. An ISMS isn't just a product you buy, or a configurational change you make. Rather like a religion with rites and ceremonies, it is something you must observe every day.

Control-Point Versus Procedural Standards

There are 2 kinds of IT Security standards in this world, there are those that are control-point based and there are those that are procedure-based.  ISO 27001 is control-point based, meaning that it tells you what controls need to be in place to ensure the right outcome. It is not a prescriptive "how-to" for the configuration of your IT. A control-point standard can be said to apply across a broad range of organisations with different sizes and operational patterns because the standard steers clear of the minutiae. Procedure-based standards can struggle to cater for such a broad range of organisations. However, IT staff find control-point standards harder to implement in technical configuration. 360is helps companies translate the control-point objectives of ISO 27001 into practical, technical configuration, procedures, and documentation.

How Much Does ISO 27001 Cost?

The cost of getting ISO 27001 certification depends on:

• The size of your company and scope of the ISO 27001 certificate
• The maturity level of your ISMS 
• The gap between the current state and the desired state of the control environment
• The in-house capability/capacity to develop the ISMS and close the gaps
• How quickly the certificate is required

If you are a large organisation, wishing to certify the whole of your operations, and you have not previously invested much in ISMS, or people with the skills to build and operate such a system, then you are going to have to spend more getting ISO 27001. These costs come from 3 places:

• The first is the cost of getting your ISMS up to scratch, "pre-certification"
• The second is the certification process itself
• The third is the cost of your annual certification audit in years 2 and beyond

Given the fact that there are so many variables, we will use a real client of ours as an example:

• 50 staff, 1 office, in the UK
• Processes sensitive data, some personally identifiable information, for medium sized banks
• Co-locates at two UK data centers
• Provides software (SaaS) at these data centers
• Has a control environment that, while previously subject to external review, would still be best referred to as immature and non-fully documented
• Has staff that are technical but not ISO 27001/ISO 27002 aware
• Pressure from clients for independent attestation, some ask for ISO 27001
• Need to achieve certificate (without great disruption to business) within 1 year
• Requires a fair degree of ISO-27001 consulting to prep for the certification audit

The “external” costs to become ISO 27001 certified were:

• Pre-certification Part 1: £15,000 (Scope Definition, Risk Assessment, Risk Treatment Plan, Gap Assessment, Part 2 Remediation Plan)
• Pre-certification Part 2: £15,000 (Gap closure (collaboratively), registrar selection, ISMS Artifact development, Risk Management Committee, Incident Response, Internal ISMS Audit, On-site Certification Audit Support)
• Certification Audit: £15,000
• Total cost for ISO 27001 certificate: £45,000

To this one-time cost we can add the annual external audit in year 2 (£5000) and internal ISMS audit (£5000) in year 2.

Of these costs, the pre-certification is likely to be by far the greatest, unless you are already well prepared. It is also possible that pre-certification costs for your organisation could be significantly higher than those shown here. We have known organisations need up-to £50,000 of pre-certification work on their existing ISMS. Finally, you should also consider the omissions below carefully:

Omissions: We ignore other associated annual costs such as annual penetration testing, maintenance and support costs of the ISMS infrastructure, and the cost of any staff (new or existing) or training required to operate the ISMS. We ignore the costs of new products (hardware/software) or services which you may need to build an ISMS if you do not already have something suitable to work with. If your organisation is very large or very complex, you will have a lot of Information Security to manage. The cost of the management systems/software may be significant.

Concluding Remarks

ISO 27001 is not a one-time exam, it is more like a religion. It is a commitment to do things the right way every day, and to submit to regular audits to confirm you are observing the religions practices every day, not just when the vicar comes to tea. The total cost of ISO 27001 certification is dependent in large part on the status and strength of your existing ISMS, which should not come as a surprise.

If you would like help preparing for ISO 27001, straightforward advice on improving your Information Security posture, answering Information Security challenges from clients or the regulator, talk to us.

360is at Infosecurity Europe 2014

London Underground Backup Plan

Three Sixty Information Security Ltd will again be at Earls Court, London for the Infosecurity Europe show, 29th April to 1st May 2014. We'll be meeting clients, partners, and friends among the 12000 expected visitors and 329 stands at the show this year.

If you want to discuss the results of a penetration test, arrange a confidential meeting about a  breach, or just need advice on how your organisation should handle the OpenSSL Heartbleed bug, get in touch. We will have technical consultants at the show.

London Underground are still running a District Line service during the 48 hour tube strike, but remember you can always take a bus!

A Quick Enumeration Of The PRISM Program

Enumeration of PRISM

As IT security consultants, former representatives at the GSMA, contributors to IETF's "Raven", and one-time employes of the worlds largest ISP, the inevitable questions started coming up in meetings and conversations shortly after the 8th June.

"...two reporters from the Guardian newspaper announced to the world the source of one of the most significant classified-document leaks in history. Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old national-security contractor from Hawaii, revealed that he was compelled by conscience to inform the world about a massive abuse of authority perpetrated by the US National Security Agency. According to the documents Snowden provided, which have been authenticated, the US government has been systematically collecting the phone records and online communications of millions of American citizens for years."

Clients, commentators, and friends all want answers to the same questions:

1. What are the NSA doing, and how are they doing it?
2. What does this mean for IT security?
3. Where does this go next?

While we can expect this story to develop over many months as more information is dripped out,  we can already go some way towards answering question (1). See the 360is enumeration of PRISM possibilities. PDF.

Where will the story go next? That this story will run and run is something of which we can be sure. It has elements of Manning/Wikileaks (an ethically conflicted individual with access to state secrets), of Leeson/Barings (a young man, on the run from authorities in a foreign land), and just enough direct relevance to UK readers through glimpses into the actions our own GCHQ, who are normally more publicity shy than their US counterparts. The UK intelligence services have been relatively fortunate in recent years, suffering  few leaks, disgruntled former employees, or clumsiness. This episode illustrates both the frequency and extent to which intelligence sharing occurs between the UK and US and the fact that occurrences such as the Snowden event can have an impact for both services with unintended consequences that cannot be anticipated easily.

Timing is everything,  the publication of these revelations may have some bearing on future of The Draft Communications Data Bill or "Snoopers Charter" as it is commonly known. With well publicised recent convictions of a number of terrorist individuals and groups, significant good-will had been earned among the UK public. Any poor handling of the existing Snowden disclosures, and further leaks that are yet to come, may diminish this good-will and make introduction of such a bill more difficult in the future. Futhermore, the disclosure of GCHQ's activities around the 2009 G20 summit in London is bound to have an impact at the G8 event currently in-progress in Northern Ireland.

Looking further out, companies and individuals in Europe may seek to engage with services and providers that do not come directly under US law. Apple, Microsoft, and FaceBook (3 out of many providers) have stated that they handed over data from 10000, 32000, and 19000 accounts respectively in 7 months. US cloud providers are already having trouble persuading European enterprise customers that their sensitive (but completely legal) data is safe from US government spying. This leak will only make matters worse. As one journalist put it "Not subject to American law' - the next desirable IT feature?"

All that we need now is a catchy name for this episode. Dotcomgate? igate? How about "Cloudgate"?

360is will be presenting further analysis of "Cloudgate"and advice for UK organisations in the next edition of Executive Intelligence, our quarterly for UK CSOs and Information Security Managers.

Related Postings:
WikiLeak's Lessons For UK Information Security Professionals.

Update Saturday 8 June 2013 18.56 BST: Leaked NSA slides confirm, PRISM includes direct monitoring of fiber cables and collection directly from the servers of MS, Yahoo, Google, and Co.

360is Guide to Understanding, Commissioning, & Maximising Value from Penetration Testing or Security Assessments

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Clients often contact us while weighing up the value of getting a Security Assessment or Penetration Test. Whether it's a recent breach, compliance obligation, the regulator, or auditors that trigger the inquiry, we find ourselves repeating similar advice during those initial conversations. Their questions may be familiar to you;

• What exactly is a Penetration Test?
• Is it any different from a “scan” or a “vulnerability assessment”?
• What will it really do for us?
• What do we do with the results?
• How do I evaluate different companies offering this service?
• Why can’t I get a consistent budgetary cost from the market?

We've recorded the answers to these questions and more in one place, using consistent language,  in a way that can be understood by both IT and non-IT professionals alike. Whether you are a systems administrator, or a CSO (more likely in the UK, IT Director/Manager) you will be able to use this guide to reduce the time taken to protect your assets, meet your business needs, and keep the customer/auditor/regulator/boss happy.

Aren’t there already countless guides, papers, and articles on Penetration Testing and security? Certainly. However, most of them are years old, focused on (or written from) a non-UK perspective, or are difficult for non-technical readers to understand. Our guide is different.

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• UK & European perspective: While you can find an abundance of articles discussing Penetration Testing within the context of HIPAA, SOX, and FISMA, scarcely a nod is given to UK and European regulations and standards. Hackers may not respect geography, but your organisation still has to.

• Up to date: While technical details of vulnerabilities have changed, sysadmins, programmers, and engineers are still making many of the same mistakes now as when we did our first assessment in the mid 90s. However, language changes, an organisation’s view of IT changes, as do end-user working practices. This document reflects that, taking a contemporary view of the subject.

• Non-technical: Couched in ordinary terms the business can understand, this guide avoids much of the technical jargon that makes other articles heavy-reading for those whom IT security is not their full time occupation. While the skills employed may be highly technical, we can’t lose sight of the business problems being solved.

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We hope this guide will help many of our clients and future clients get the most from a Security Assessment/Penetration test (whether provided by 360is, our contemporaries, or your own IT security team):

Penetration Testing Guide, Part 1.

An Introduction to Penetration Testing. [PDF]

Penetration Testing Guide, Part 2.

Selecting A Penetration Testing Company. [PDF]

Penetration Testing Guide, Part 3.

Maximising Value From A Penetration Test. [PDF]

The Consolidated Penetration Testing Guide.

Parts 1,2, and 3 all in one document. [PDF]
Parts 1,2, and 3, text only, academic, no commentary. [PDF]

There will always be something missing from such a document; specific relevance to your particular situation. Get in touch to complete the picture. 360is is a company where you can talk to a client account manager who can get a consultant on the phone, without prior arrangement and without running the meter. Contact Us.

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 Update 24-05-2012
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